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Uncertainty and the Politics of Employment Protection
*
 
This paper investigates the role that idiosyncratic uncertainty plays in shaping social 
preferences over the degree of labor market flexibility, in a general equilibrium model of 
dynamic labor demand where the productivity of firms evolves over time as a Geometric 
Brownian motion. A key result demonstrated is that how the economy responds to shocks, 
i.e. unexpected changes in the drift and standard deviation of the stochastic process 
describing the dynamics of productivity, depends on the power of labor to extract rents and 
on the status quo level of firing costs. In particular, we show that when firing costs are 
relatively low to begin with, a transition to a rigid labor market is favored by all and only the 
employed workers with idiosyncratic productivity below some threshold value. A more volatile 
environment, and a lower rate of productivity growth, i.e. “bad times,” increase the political 
support for more labor market rigidity only where labor appropriates of relatively large rents. 
Moreover, we demonstrate that when the status quo level of firing costs is relatively high, the 
preservation of a rigid labor market is favored by the employed with intermediate productivity, 
whereas all other workers favor more flexibility. The coming of better economic conditions 
need not favor the demise of high firing costs in rigid high-rents economies, because “good 
times” cut down the support for flexibility among the least productive employed workers. The 
model described provides some new insights on the comparative dynamics of labor market 
institutions in the U.S. and in Europe over the last few decades, shedding some new light 
both on the reasons for the original build-up of “Eurosclerosis,” and for its the persistence up 
to the present day. 
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Employment protection legislation, or ￿￿ring costs,￿varies considerably both across countries
and over time. Within the OECD, stringent job security provisions are currently implemented
in several Continental European countries, whereas other countries such as the U.K. and espe-
cially the U.S. have relatively ￿ exible labor markets. There is also evidence that in Continental
Europe ￿ring costs have gradually become higher since the early 1970￿ s, the period traditionally
associated with the build-up of ￿Eurosclerosis,￿and have been reduced modestly in a number
of countries since the beginning of the 1990￿ s.1 In a few countries, such as France, there is
no evidence that in recent years ￿ring restrictions, and other forms labor market rigidities,
have been reduced at all. The current persistence of the high ￿ring costs legislated over past
decades is particularly remarkable, since the issue of the reform of rigid labor market institu-
tions toward more ￿ exibility has been in recent times often at the top of the political agenda
of many governments of Continental Europe. Yet, relatively little progress has been actually
made in this direction, because of the decisive opposition of unions as well as of some pivotal
political parties.2
In this paper, we present a general equilibrium model of dynamic labor demand, where the
productivity of active ￿rms varies over time according to a Geometric Brownian motion. The
model, whose fundamentals and economic equilibrium are described and completely character-
ized in the ￿rst part of the paper, is then used to investigate how institutional and economic
factors a⁄ect the emergence and the potential persistence of political support for employment
protection regulations.
An essential feature of the model presented is that employed workers appropriate of a rent,
i.e. of an economic bene￿t in excess of the utility of the unemployed. The rent appropriated
by employed workers depends both on exogenous institutional factors, i.e. the ￿bargaining
power￿of labor, on the idiosyncratic productivity of the workers (who are ex-ante identical
but become ex-post heterogeneous due to their variable labor market status), and on the level
of the reservation productivity at which ￿rms quit operating. The rent is also a⁄ected by the
parameters of the stochastic process governing the evolution of the productivity of the ￿rms,
i.e. the drift and the instantaneous standard deviation, which characterize respectively the
average rate of growth of productivity and its volatility, and describe the fundamentals of the
economic environment.
1See for example Cabellero and Hammour (1998), Blanchard (2000), and Blanchard and Wolfers (2000).
2See Saint-Paul (1996) for a discussion of the empirical evidence.
1Job security provisions correspond to a legislated tax, the ￿ring costs, imposed on the ￿rms
which decide to lay-o⁄ their employes. The level of ￿ring costs is a key endogenous variable
in the model and it is determined through a political process based on standard majority
voting. Higher ￿ring costs bene￿t the workers since they arti￿cially extend the duration of
jobs by reducing the reservation productivity, and therefore increase the total value of the rent
appropriated by each employed worker. Yet, the decision of the workers to vote for a more
rigid labor market, i.e. for a higher tax on ￿rings, is a non-trivial one due to the general
equilibrium e⁄ects of job security provisions. Higher ￿ring costs increase the total cost of labor
borne by ￿rms, and therefore reduce job creation. As a result, in general equilibrium higher
￿ring costs depress the exit rate from unemployment, to the detriment of both the utility
of the unemployed and of the employed workers (whose prospects of future re-employment
conditionally on being ￿red become less favorable).
The trade-o⁄ posed by higher ￿ring costs is a⁄ected by the same variables determining
the value of the rent appropriated by the employed workers. Of special importance, is the
bargaining power of workers, i.e. their ability to extract rents from the ￿rms employing them.
Because the total value of the rent appropriated by the employed is proportional to their
bargaining power, when this power is small enough there is little scope to protect jobs and
the associated rents with legislated ￿ring restrictions. In particular, we show that in this
scenario the workers are unanimously in favor of zero ￿ring costs, regardless on what their
status quo level is. In the opposite case where the bargaining power of the workers is above a
critical threshold, we show that workers split in two opposite coalitions, favoring respectively
a rigid and a ￿ exible labor market. In this scenario, individual preferences over ￿ring costs
depend on labor market status, i.e. whether a worker is employed or unemployed and, in the
case of the employed workers, on their idiosyncratic productivity at the moment of voting,
and on the status quo level of ￿ring costs. Speci￿cally, we show that when ￿ring costs are
relatively low to begin with, a transition to a rigid labor market is favored by the employed
workers with idiosyncratic productivity below some threshold value. All the unemployed and
the most productive employed are instead in favor of low ￿ring costs. We also show that when
the ￿ring costs in place are high, a rigid labor market is preferred by the employed workers
with intermediate productivity, i.e. belonging to a connected subset of the support of the
distribution of productivity across active ￿rms. Vice versa, a ￿ exible labor market is preferred
by an extreme coalition involving again all the unemployed, as well as the more and the
less productive employed. Intuitively, regardless on what the status quo is, the unemployed
2prefer to eliminate ￿ring restrictions in order to induce ￿rms to create more jobs, reducing
the expected duration of their unemployment spell. The preferences of the employed are
instead shaped by the assumption that the productivity of ￿rms evolves over time according
to a Geometric Brownian process. This assumption is important, since the (almost sure)
continuity of paths of a Geometric Brownian process, implies that the expected duration of
the job of an employed worker depends positively on his idiosyncratic productivity. As a
result, the marginal gain of increasing ￿ring costs for the employed workers decreases with
their productivity. Because highly productive workers gain relatively little from higher rigidity,
they prefer a more ￿ exible labor market. The employed workers with productivity below some
threshold create the potential coalition for rigidity, since higher ￿ring costs may increase their
total utility by providing them valuable insulation from the risk of job loss due to some future
bad shocks. However, if the economy is relatively rigid to begin with, the least productive
employed workers are also in favor of a ￿ exible labor market. The reason is that, since their
job is about to end anyway, they prefer to make the labor market more ￿ exible to the rigid
status quo, in order to improve their future re-employment prospects.
The analysis of the politico-economic equilibrium reveals some additional interesting and
surprising insights. In particular, we show that a complementarity arises in the equilibrium of
the model between the volatility of productivity and labor market ￿ exibility, in the sense that
in a more turbulent environment, the positive e⁄ect that more ￿ exibility has on job creation is
magni￿ed, to the bene￿t of all workers. A similar complementary, though, arises since higher
volatility also magni￿es the rent erosion e⁄ect caused by a reduction of ￿ring costs. Where the
power of rent extraction of the employed is relatively high, the magni￿cation of the marginal
loss from ￿ exibility due to rent erosion, dominates over the magni￿cation of the marginal gain
due to job creation. As a result, labor market ￿ exibility enjoys less political support overall,
precisely because rents are relatively important for the workers. The opposite is true where the
employed are able to extract relatively low rents from ￿rms, in which case the magni￿cation of
the marginal gain from ￿ exibility dominates over the magni￿cation of the marginal loss, making
labor market ￿ exibility more appealing. In addition, we also show that a substitutability arises
in the equilibrium of the model between productivity growth and labor market ￿ exibility, in
the sense that higher productivity growth reduces both the positive and the negative marginal
e⁄ect of ￿ exibility on the welfare of the employed. Again, if the rent extraction power of the
workers is large enough, the marginal loss caused by ￿ exibility due to rent erosion, decreases
relative to the marginal gain due to job creation, increasing the political support for a more
3￿ exible labor market, and vice versa.
The broader signi￿cance of this result is that how economic shocks, i.e. unexpected changes
in the parameters governing the evolution of the productivity of the ￿rms, a⁄ect the political
equilibrium of the model, depends on the power of labor to extract rents. This ￿nding can
help to explain the divergent evolution of the labor market institutions in high and low rents
economies, i.e. Continental Europe vs. the U.S. and the U.K., since the early 1970￿ s, in
response to similar negative aggregate shocks generating high volatility and low growth.
Finally, we show that, whereas bad business conditions may favor the demise of relatively
￿ exible labor market institutions, the opposite type of shock need not help to create more
political support for a reversion to labor market ￿ exibility in a rigid economy. This is so
since good economic conditions, i.e. low volatility and fast productivity growth, cut down the
political support for low ￿ring costs among the least productive employed workers. Intuitively,
this is because these workers expect to earn more future rents conditionally on remaining
employed and, as a result, prefer to keep in place the high barriers protecting their relatively
fragile present employment status.
This paper is related to a variety of di⁄erent contributions including primarily previous
models of political economy of labor market institutions, such as Lindbeck and Snower (1988)
and Saint-Paul (1993),3 as well as the more recent contributions of Saint-Paul (1999 and
2002). The main di⁄erence between my paper and Saint-Paul (1999 and 2002), is that his
model addresses the question of how the preferences for employment protection are a⁄ected
by the rate of growth of embodied productivity within a vintage capital model, rather then
by idiosyncratic productivity ￿ uctuations as in my model. By focusing on a di⁄erent form of
productivity growth, disembodied in ￿rms rather than embodied, I obtain a number of di⁄erent
comparative statics results. In particular, whereas Saint-Paul ￿nds that higher productivity
growth reduces unambiguously the political support for employment protection regulation, I
￿nd that how growth a⁄ects the political equilibrium generally depends both on the bargaining
power of labor, and on the status quo level of ￿ring costs. In addition, Saint-Paul does not
investigate how volatility, which plays an essential role in my model, a⁄ects the politico-
economic equilibrium.
Secondly, the paper is related to the important models of dynamic labor demand of Bentolila
and Bertola (1990) and of Mortensen and Pissarides (1994). The paper of Bentolila and
Bertola (1990) presents a partial equilibrium model with a stochastic structure identical to
3See also Saint-Paul (2000) for a survey of this litetature.
4the one assumed here, which I extend to allow for the endogenous determination of wages,
labor market ￿ ows and ￿ring costs. Mortensen and Pissarides￿(1994) model has a dynamic
general equilibrium structure, based on the assumption that ￿rms experience productivity
shocks described by a homogenous Poisson process, rather than by a Geometric Brownian
process as assumed here. This assumption implies that the expected duration of a match
does not depend on the level of its idiosyncratic productivity, unlike in my model where more
productive workers expect to remain employed longer. Because in a Mortensen and Pissarides￿
type of setup all employed workers face the same exposure to productivity shocks, they all
have potentially the same preferences over employment protection legislation. Conversely, as
already explained, in my model more productive workers tend to demand less ￿ring costs due
to their relative insulation from the risk of job loss. In addition, some results relative to
the comparative statics around the economic equilibrium are di⁄erent. For example, in my
model higher volatility has a positive e⁄ect on job creation overall, whereas in Mortensen and
Pissarides￿it has the opposite e⁄ect.4
Also related in the macro-labor literature are the papers of Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998),
of Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993), of Bertola (1994) and of MacLeod, Malcomson, and
Gomme (1994). Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998) argue the surge of unemployment in Europe
since the 1970￿ s can be explained with how layo⁄taxes and unemployment compensation linked
to past earnings interact with an increase in economic turbulence. Hopenhayn and Rogerson
(1993) address the questions of how taxes on job destruction a⁄ect social welfare in a dynamic
general equilibrium model of labor demand. Bertola (1994) investigates the e¢ ciency costs and
distributional e⁄ects of obstacles to labor mobility, in a model of endogenous growth with di-
versi￿able microeconomic uncertainty. MacLeod, Malcomson, and Gomme (1994) investigate
how changes in the economic environment a⁄ect wages and employment in e¢ ciency wage
models.
Lastly, the paper is related to the political economy literature on ine¢ cient redistribution
(e.g. Coate and Morris, 1995; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2001), and on the persistence of policies
and institutions (e.g. Fernandez and Rodrik, 1991; Coate and Morris, 1999; BØnabou, 2000;
Acemoglu, Ticchi and Vindigni, 2006; Bruegemann, 2007). In particular, in an in￿ uential
paper BØnabou (2000) demonstrates that ￿unequal societies,￿featuring very di⁄erent degrees
of ￿scal redistribution of income and of inequality, can arise and persist in a dynamic model of
political economy of taxation, depending on the initial degree of income inequality. Moreover,
4See also the comprehesive discussion of search and matching models of the labor market presented and their
properties in Pissarrides (2000).
5in a recent paper, Bruegemann (2007) also addresses the speci￿c question of the persistence of
rigid labor market institutions, under alternative assumptions regarding the wage setting rule.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays down the foundations of the model, whose
economic equilibrium is obtained and characterized in section 3. The political equilibrium, its
properties and some important applications of the model are characterized in sections 4, 5 and




The economy is a small and open one, populated by a continuum of measure one of risk
neutral workers who always consume all of their disposable income. Workers can be employed
or unemployed, and discount future welfare at rate r equal to the real interest rate. Hence,
letting fyug
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where Et denotes the expected value operator, conditional on the information available at
t. Firms are created by a small set of risk neutral entrepreneurs, by paying a ￿xed setup
normalized at zero. The available production technology is Leontief, allowing a ￿rm to produce
some amount of output per unit of time by hiring one worker only. There are no search
frictions, are therefore ￿rms ￿ll up their vacancy instantaneously. The productivity x of each
￿rm is normalized to one at moment when the ￿rm is created, but it varies over time due to
the realization of random idiosyncratic shocks. Speci￿cally, x follows a Geometric Brownian
process, whose stochastic di⁄erential is represented by
dx = ￿xdt + ￿xdW; (2)
where W stands for a Wiener process. The parameters ￿ 2 R+ and ￿ 2 R++ indicate respec-
tively the drift and the instantaneous standard deviation of x. To ensure the existence of an
equilibrium, we restrict the parameters in question, by assuming that ￿ < ￿2=2.
Because productivity is variable, a ￿rm may eventually decide to stop producing and to lay-
o⁄ the worker. When this event happens, the ￿rm pays the mandatory ￿ring costs F ￿ 0 for
dismissing the worker, which represent a pure deadweight loss, i.e. the corresponding income
6is entirely wasted. The ￿ring costs F are chosen by the society through a standard political
process based on majority voting, described in greater detail in Section 4.
The value of a ￿rm J (￿) active at time t 2 R+, i.e. the expected present discounted value
of the stream of pro￿ts gross of the layo⁄ cost, as a function of its productivity x = xt, can be
written as





e￿r(u￿t) [x ￿ w(x)]du ￿ e￿r( ￿ T￿t)F
)
; (3)
where the supremum is taken over the set of possible stopping times ￿ T, at which the ￿rm can
decide to quit producing and to lay-o⁄ the worker, i.e. [t;1). By standard arguments,5 the
value function J (￿) satis￿es the following Bellman-Wald functional equation
rJ (x) = max
￿






which characterizes the optimal stopping problem of the ￿rm. The right-hand-side of (4) is
the maximum between the continuation value of the asset corresponding to the value of ￿rm,
and the ￿ ow-equivalent (or annuity value) of the ￿ring costs F. The continuation value is
equal to the ￿ ow payo⁄ generated by the asset, plus the expected capital gain. The solution of
the optimization problem represented by equation (4) involves implementing a barrier-control
policy. The ￿rm closes down, laying-o⁄ its worker and paying the mandatory ￿ring costs F if,
and as soon as, its productivity reaches a reservation level R, corresponding to an optimally
set threshold. The optimal stopping rule of the ￿rm is characterized in the appendix of the
paper, where we solve the free-boundary problem represented by the di⁄erential equation
associated with the functional equation (4), and the related optimality conditions (i.e. the
￿value matching￿and the ￿smooth pasting￿conditions). For future reference, we de￿ne the
random calendar time ￿ Tx (R) at which the level of stochastic process describing the productivity
of a ￿rm active at time t 2 R+ with xt = x, is absorbed by the barrier R as
￿ Tx (R) ￿ inf fu 2 [t;1) : xu = Rjxt = xg: (5)
The value of a ￿rm J (￿) also satis￿es the initial value condition following from the standard
assumption of free entry, which implies that ￿rms earn no pure pro￿ts in equilibrium, since
the ex-ante value of job creation, i.e. corresponding to the initial level of productivity x = 1 is
equalized to the zero setup cost. Formally, free entry of vacancies implies that
J (1) = 0: (6)
5See for example Dixit (1993), Dixit and Pindyck (1994), Peskir and Shiryaev (2006).
72.2 Wage Setting Mechanism
We now describe the wage setting mechanism. It is useful to begin by breaking down expression
(1) into a pair of recursive equations satis￿ed by the values of employment and of unemploy-
ment. The value W (x) of working in a ￿rm with idiosyncratic productivity x 2 (R;1), and
the value U of unemployment satisfy the following system of functional equations





rU = b + ￿(W (1) ￿ U); (8)
where w(x) is the wage rate paid by the ￿rm to the worker, b is the exogenous level of unemploy-
ment compensation (or value of leisure), and ￿ stands for the exit rate out of unemployment,
which is endogenous to the model.
I assume the same wage setting mechanism hypothesized in Saint-Paul (1999), where it is
assumed that a worker employed in a ￿rm with productivity x earns a salary such that the
corresponding value of employment is equal to the value of unemployment plus a fraction ￿
of the expected present discounted value of the output stream produced by the ￿rm. The
sharing rule in question, represented by equation (9) below, can be given a micro-foundation
as the expression of the rents that ￿rms need to pay to the workers to cope with an underlying
moral hazard problem.6 The sharing rule (9) has the important implication that ￿ring costs
a⁄ect wages only indirectly, i.e. by reducing the reservation productivity, rather than also
directly, i.e. by a⁄ecting the relative bargaining power of workers and ￿rms.7 While the e⁄ect
of employment protection legislation over the bargaining power of the ￿rms is also potentially
interesting, I intend to focus the attention only on the role of ￿ring costs in extending the
duration of jobs, which the sharing rule (9) allows me to do.
More formally, I assume that the wage w(x) paid to a worker by a ￿rm with productivity
x is such that
6As equation (9) makes transparent, the sharing rule that we assume can be interpreted as a generalization
of the standard sharing rule applying in e¢ ciency wage models (e.g. Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984). The main
di⁄erence is that whereas in a standard e¢ ciency wage model the employed obtain a rent equal to a ￿xed markup
over the value of unemployment, (9) implies that the rent is variable, re￿ ecting the idiosyncratic productivity
of the ￿rm. See Saint-Paul (1999) for the exposition of the micro-foundation leading to the sharing rule (9)
7This is the case, for example, if wages are set with Nash bargaining, in which case higher ￿ring costs (which
￿rms are supposed to pay), make workers stronger at the bargaining table by increasing the cost of a negotiation
breakdown for the ￿rms.
8W (x) = U + ￿V (x): (9)
In this expression, W (x) and U are de￿ned recursively by (7) and (8), and






represents the expected present discounted value of the future output stream generated by a
￿rm having at time t a productivity level xt = x, up to the absorption time ￿ Tx (R) de￿ned by
(5), computed with respect to the probability distribution of ￿ Tx (R). The parameter ￿ 2 (0;1)
in (9) represents the power of rent extraction of employed workers.
An immediate consequence of the moral hazard problem leading to the sharing rule (9) is
the existence of involuntary unemployment: the unemployed are willing to work for a wage
lower than the wage paid to the employed, but ￿rms are nonetheless unwilling to hire them.
Notice that, because at the moment when the absorbing barrier R is reached, the worker is
￿red and the match broken, it is the case that V (R) = 0. This fact and the sharing rule (9)
imply that the following terminal condition also holds
W (R) = U; (10)
according to which the value of employment at the reservation productivity R is equal to the
value of unemployment. As demonstrated in the appendix, the wage schedule implied by the
sharing rule (9) reads
w(x) = b + ￿￿V (1) + ￿x: (11)


























where ￿ corresponds to the negative root of the characteristic polynomial associated with the
di⁄erential equation satis￿ed by J (￿).8
8The expression of ￿ is reported in equation (43) in the appendix.
93 Economic Equilibrium
3.1 Aggregation
In this subsection, we begin the description of the economic equilibrium of the model, assuming
that a steady state featuring positive job creation and job destruction exists. In our model
economy each ￿rm is created at some point in time, and experiences thereafter the realization
of idiosyncratic shocks to its productivity, until the time when absorbing barrier R is reached.
While the duration of the life-span of each ￿rm is random, the evolution over time of the cohort
of ￿rms created at the same point in time is deterministic, since every cohort of new ￿rms is
formed by a continuum of units. Therefore, by a law of large numbers, the deterministic
fraction of the ￿rms of each cohort that are still active at any point in time following their
creation, corresponds to the survival probability of a ￿rm from the same cohort up to that
time.
Because the transition density function of the stochastic process (2) describing the dynamics
of productivity is time-homogenous, the random time T (R) ￿ ￿ T1 (R)￿t elapsed since the time
t of creation of a ￿rm (when productivity is xt = 1) at which absorption takes place, does not
depend on the calendar time of creation of the ￿rm. Therefore, we can write the probability
distribution of T (R) as follows




where p(1;￿;u) denotes the transition density function of x, conditional on the absence of
absorption since the moment of creation of the ￿rm t up to time t + u.
At time s, the ￿ ow of workers from unemployment into employment, equivalent to the mass
of newly created production units, has measure ￿s (1 ￿ Ls), where Ls denotes the total mass of
employed workers at s. Therefore, assuming that the economy begins operating at time 0, the
total employment Lt at time t can be decomposed as the (integral) sum of the ￿rms created
over the period [0;t], weighting the mass of ￿rms of each cohort9 by the survival probability




￿t￿s (1 ￿ Lt￿s)PrfT (R) > sgds: (14)
In the steady state, all aggregate labor market outcomes are stationary, and therefore
Lt = L; ￿t = ￿; and ￿t = ￿, where ￿t indicates the aggregate job destruction rate. Moreover,
9We remind that each active ￿rm hires one worker only.
10the labor market ￿ ows-balance condition
￿L = ￿(1 ￿ L); (15)
equating the number of jobs destroyed per unit of time, ￿L, to the number of jobs created,
also applies in the steady state. Combining the steady state form of expression (14), obtained
by imposing stationarity and letting t " 1, and equation (15), the aggregate steady state job
destruction rate ￿ can be written as
￿ =
1 R 1
0 PrfT (R) > tgdt
: (16)
3.2 Characterization
Given the level of ￿ring costs implemented (which will be determined later in the political
equilibrium), the economic equilibrium of the model is de￿ned by a pair of equations in two
endogenous variables, the reservation productivity R and the exit rate from unemployment ￿.


















The second equation corresponds to the ￿value matching￿ condition, which arises from the
solution of the optimal stopping problem of the ￿rm (see the appendix), and establishes the

















Equation (17) can be used to obtain the expression of the rate of job creation, as a function
of the reservation productivity, or
￿ =
r(1 ￿ ￿)R1￿￿ + ￿((r ￿ ￿)b ￿ r(1 ￿ ￿))
￿+￿ (1 ￿ R1￿￿)
; (19)
where ￿+ ￿ j￿j. Equations (18) and (19) can then be combined to obtain a single equation









Equation (20) states that the expected present discounted value of the ￿ ow of gross pro￿ts of a
￿rm is equal to the ￿ring costs (the only cost borne by ￿rms other than wages). The economic
11equilibrium of the model has a recursive structure. Equation (20) de￿nes a downward-sloping
relation between R and F, which determines the unique equilibrium value of the reservation
productivity, as a function of a set of exogenous parameters including ￿ring costs (which
are determined endogenously in the political equilibrium, but are still treated as given here).
Finally, the equilibrium value of ￿ can be computed using the equilibrium value of R and
equation (18), which de￿nes a strictly upward sloping locus in the (R;￿) plane.
Remark 1 Since the productivity of a ￿rm is always non-negative,10 the reservation pro-
ductivity R has a lower bound at zero, and equation (20) implies the level of ￿ring costs





If F = ~ F, ￿rms never close down and, as a result, the model has a steady state where
the rate of job destruction is zero and all workers are employed, contrary to the assumption
made that a steady state exists with strictly positive job creation and destruction. To ensure
the existence of a stationary economic equilibrium with the desired properties, the following
restriction is imposed on F.





We conclude this subsection by reporting the closed-form expression of ￿, which is computed
in the appendix, along with the closed-form expression of the ergodic probability density func-
tion of productivity across active ￿rms, which is also computed in the appendix of the paper,
when R < 1, i.e. ￿ring costs are strictly positive.










where ^ R+ ￿ jlnRj, and the ergodic cross-sectional distribution of productivity across ￿rms,
￿(￿), has probability density function   (￿) represented by11
  (x) =
1
^ R+
1 ￿ IfR￿x￿1g + x
2￿














, and I denotes the indicator function de￿ned in the standard way.
10This follows immediately from the assumptions made relative to the initial value and to the dynamics of x.
11I am especially grateful to Bjoern Bruegemann and Simone Scotti for help in the computation of the ergodic
distribution of productivity.
12Proof. See appendix.
Remark 2 Equation (20) implies that R = 1 in the limit case where F = 0, i.e. the reservation
productivity is equal to the standardized initial productivity level. As a result, both the rate
of job creation (19) and the rate of job destruction (22) are in￿nite, and therefore the duration
of any spell of employment and of unemployment is approximately zero. Moreover, the cross-
sectional distribution of productivity across employment has a mass-point at x = 1.
3.3 Comparative Statics
The economic equilibrium of the model has a number of comparative statics properties, some of
which are relatively non-standard. These properties are discussed next, under the quali￿cation
that the ￿ring costs F are always held constant as the parameters of interests are allowed to
vary around the economic equilibrium.
1. Higher ￿ring costs F reduce the reservation productivity R since ￿rms prefer to hold on
longer when layo⁄s are more costly; as a result, both the exit rate from unemployment
￿ and the aggregate rate of job destruction rate ￿ (which are increasing in R) fall. It
follows from equation (15) that higher ￿ring costs have overall ambiguous e⁄ects on the
level of equilibrium employment.12
2. A higher value of the rent extraction power ￿ reduces the reservation productivity, the
exit rate from unemployment and the job destruction rate. The reservation productivity
falls since ￿rms prefer to hold on for a longer time, as they need to compensate for the
resulting loss of ￿ ow-pro￿ts due to a higher ￿. The job destruction rate falls as a result
of the fact that the reservation productivity is lower. The exit rate from unemployment
decreases with ￿ both because of the direct negative e⁄ect of ￿ on pro￿tability, and
because of the general equilibrium e⁄ect that ￿ has on ￿ going through the reservation
productivity, which is positively related with ￿ by (19).
3. Higher volatility ￿ decreases the equilibrium reservation productivity, because in a more
turbulent environment the option value of a job is higher for the ￿rm. It follows that
the impact of ￿ on the steady state aggregate rate of job destruction ￿ is ambiguous.
This is because ￿ increases with ￿ in partial equilibrium, i.e. holding R constant, but
12This is a very well known and general result, ￿rst pointed out by Bentolila and Bertola (1990) and more
recently, among others, by Blanchard and Portugal (2001).
13it also decreases with ￿ through R, due to the negative e⁄ect that volatility has on the
reservation productivity, and to the fact that ￿ increases with R.
4. Higher volatility stimulates job creation, i.e. it raises ￿. This is a consequence of the
convexity e⁄ect of volatility, which increases the value of a ￿rm and therefore drives up
job creation.13 Notice that this is a general equilibrium e⁄ect, which dominates over the
negative partial equilibrium e⁄ect that ￿ has on ￿ due to the fact that ￿ increases with
R, and that R decreases in equilibrium with ￿ as we already know.
5. A higher value of the drift coe¢ cient ￿ increases the equilibrium reservation productivity
and the job destruction rate but has a priori ambiguous e⁄ects on the exit rate from
unemployment. The reservation productivity, and therefore ￿ as well, increases since
higher productivity growth raises pro￿tability, which means that R must increase as well
in order to restore the economic equilibrium. The impact of ￿ on ￿ is instead ambiguous,
since both the value of output and the cost of labor are increasing in ￿, which has
therefore opposite e⁄ects on pro￿tability.
Notice that the set of comparative statics results implies that the e⁄ects of all the parame-
ters considered, not just of ￿ring costs, on equilibrium employment are a priori ambiguous.
4 Politics
4.1 The Political Mechanism
We assume that a given level of ￿ring costs F = F0 is initially implemented, representing the
status quo level of employment protection. The status quo value of F may be changed as a
result of a majority voting process. We assume that voting on ￿ring costs takes place only
once, immediately after an unexpected shock to the exogenous variables of the model occurs
(in particular, the rent extraction power of the workers, and the drift and standard deviation
of the Brownian process describing the evolution of productivity), when the economy is in the
economic equilibrium corresponding to F = F0.14 The new legislated ￿ring costs correspond




. The assumption that voting takes
13Conversely, in a matching model with endogenous separations, and where idiosyncratic uncertainty is de-
scribed by a homogenous Poisson process, a higher arrival rate of productivity shocks reduces job creation (see
for example Pissarides, 2000).
14The assumption that voting takes place only once rules out the interesting but potentially complicated
e⁄ects that the anticipation of the future political equilibria has on the current voting decision of the workers
(see Hassler et al., 2000, and Acemoglu, Ticchi and Vindigni, 2006, for examples of dynamic political games
based on repeated majority voting).
14place immediately after a shock hits the economy re￿ ects the fact that it is optimal for the
majority of workers to vote immediately rather then to wait. This is because, if a majority is
in favor of changing the status quo, it is strictly better-o⁄ by doing it as soon as possible; vice
versa, if the majority is in favor of preserving the status quo, it gains nothing by voting later
on.
For analytical reasons, it is convenient to assume that workers vote for the level of the
e⁄ective level of employment protection, i.e. the reservation productivity R, rather than for
legal employment protection, i.e. the level of ￿ring costs F. Since a one-to-one relation
between F and R exists according to equation (20), voting on F is equivalent to voting on
the corresponding level of R. The relevant policy space is thus the interval [R;1], where R is
de￿ned as the reservation productivity corresponding to the maximum feasible level of ￿ring
costs ^ F.
It must be emphasized at this point that if the legislated ￿ring costs di⁄er from F0, the tran-
sition to the new politico-economic equilibrium is instantaneous for ￿, J (x), w(x), W (x) and
U, which are all functions of jump-variables only.15 Since the welfare of all the workers jumps
instantaneously to the steady state level corresponding to any level of ￿ring costs di⁄erent from
F0, in deciding how to vote workers simply compare their utility across di⁄erent steady states.
In particular, the transitional dynamics to the new equilibrium of all the state-variables, i.e.
the cross-sectional distribution of productivity, and the level of employment (which converge
gradually to the new ergodic distribution and to the new steady state respectively), does not
a⁄ect the voting decision of any worker.
It is not possible to characterize the political equilibrium of the model using the median
voter theorem since, as we already know, the preferences of a set of positive measure of agents
do not satisfy the single-peakness (and neither the single-crossing) property. Nonetheless, we
are able to demonstrate that the social preferences over employment protection regulation
induced by majority voting do not indeed cycle, i.e. that a political equilibrium always exists.
In particular, it is possible to demonstrate that a unique Condorcet winner supported at
unanimity exists regardless on what the status quo level of ￿ring costs is, provided the rent
extraction power of the workers is below some threshold value. When the rent extraction
power of the workers exceeds the threshold value in question, a unique political equilibrium
15Equation (20) implies that R depends only on F and therefore it immediately adjusts to the steady state
value corresponding to the new value of F. Equation (19) implies that ￿ only depends on R and therefore it
also adjusts instantaneously. Finally, the expressions of the value functions of all the workers show that the
only endogenous variables on which they depend are R and ￿.
15still exists, but the corresponding policy is not voted at unanimity and, more importantly, the
equilibrium may depend on the status quo level of employment protection. To make progress in
the characterization of the political equilibrium, we compute next the closed-form expressions
of the value functions of all workers.
4.2 The Structure of the Preferences over Labor Market Regulation
In this subsection, we describe the preferences over employment protection regulations of all
workers. We begin by computing the values of the unemployed and of the employed workers.
Combining equations (7), (8), (9), (11) and eliminating ￿ in the resulting expression by using








Straightforward di⁄erentiation of (24) shows that the value of unemployment is strictly
increasing in R. Intuitively, unemployed workers would be strictly better-o⁄ in a fully ￿ exible
labor market where layo⁄s are not constrained in any way and where therefore the exit rate
from unemployment is as high as it can be.












In the following, we will occasionally make the dependence of the value of the employed
on R explicit, by writing W (x) as W (xjR), to denote the value of employment in a ￿rm with
productivity x, conditionally on R. Similarly, we will sometime use the expression U (R) to
denote the value of unemployment, also conditionally on on R.
Equation (25) allows us to determine how the welfare of employed workers depends on a
marginal increment in R.
Lemma 1 Let R = R0 denote the status quo reservation productivity. All workers employed







bene￿t strictly from a marginal increment in labor market ￿exibility (i.e. an in￿nitesimally
16higher value of R), all workers in ￿rms with productivity x 2 (R0;x￿) are made strictly worse-
o⁄, and all workers in ￿rms with productivity x = x￿ are indi⁄erent.16
Proof. A straightforward di⁄erentiation of equation (25) shows that @W (xjR)=@R ? 0
for any R if x ? x￿, and that @W (xjR)=@R = 0 if x = x￿.
Lemma 1 tells us that the workers employed by relatively productive ￿rms (i.e. with
x > x￿) are made better-o⁄ if the labor market becomes marginally more ￿ exible, while the
workers employed by relatively unproductive ￿rms are made worse-o⁄. Intuitively, employment
protection involves bene￿ts, due to the extension of the duration of the rent appropriated by
the employed, but also costs, due to its adverse general equilibrium e⁄ect on job creation. By
di⁄erentiating equation (25), the total e⁄ect of a marginal increment of R on the welfare of
the workers with productivity x can be decomposed into two parts, corresponding respectively
to the marginal gain, @U (R)=@R, and to the marginal loss, proportional to @V (xjR)=@R.
The gain of increasing R is the same for all workers, independently from their individual
productivity, since it is due entirely to the corresponding variation of the value of unemployment
(expressed by the sum of the ￿rst two terms in (25)), which as we know is positive. Conversely,
the loss caused by more ￿ exibility, due to the reduction of the value of the rent appropriated
by the employed (i.e. the fourth term in (25)), can be shown to be decreasing in x.17 This
implies that relatively more productive workers lose relatively less by a relaxation of the ￿ring
discipline, and explains why the workers with productivity above the threshold x￿ are better-o⁄
with more ￿ exibility, and vice versa.18
From what has been said so far, it may appear that all workers with productivity below x￿
are always harmed by an increment of R. However, this is not the case because Lemma 1 only
determines how a marginal increase in labor market ￿ exibility a⁄ects the welfare of employed
workers, as opposed to a discrete increase in R. If R increases from R = R0 to a higher value
R = R0, i.e. if labor market ￿ exibility increases by a non-in￿nitesimal amount, then a set of jobs
of non-zero measure, corresponding to the ￿rms with productivity in the interval [R0;R0], that
were initially prevented from closing down by the tighter ￿ring restrictions, is instantaneously
destroyed. It can be shown that a set of positive measure of least productive workers exists,
16If R0 ￿ x
￿, the interval (R0;x
￿) is of course empty, in which case all employed workers are made strictly
better-o⁄ if ￿ring costs are relaxed in￿nitesimally.
17This follows from a straightforward di⁄erentiation of @V (xjR)=@R with respect to x.
18This result depends on the nature of the stochastic process governing the dynamics of productivity, and in
particular on the persistence proper of geometric Brownian motion. If the realizations of x were governed by a
homogeneous Poisson process, then an in￿nitesimal increment of R would have the same e⁄ect on the lifetime
utility of all of the employed.
17who are better-o⁄ if R = R0 than they are in the status quo, despite the fact that they are
￿red if the reform is implemented. Intuitively, thus is because the function W = W (xjR0)
is continuous in x over the range [R0;1).19 This means that the welfare of the employed
workers with productivity in a left-neighborhood of R0 of small radius is approximately equal
to U (R0). Moreover, voting involves here the choice between two alternatives which, for the
workers with productivity x ’ R0 is approximately equivalent to the choice between being
unemployed in a relatively rigid (i.e. with R = R0) and in a relatively ￿ exible economy (i.e.
with R = R0). Given that the value of the unemployed is everywhere increasing in R, it is
clear that the workers employed by ￿rms whose idiosyncratic productivity is su¢ ciently close
to the status quo reservation productivity R0 will vote for a more ￿ exible labor market.
This argument can be stated more formally by considering the expression of the produc-
tivity level x0
0 at which workers indi⁄erent between the two policy alternatives considered
above. Letting W (￿jR0) denote the value of employment in the status quo labor market,
as a function of idiosyncratic productivity, and letting U (R0) denote the value of unemploy-
ment in the reformed labor market, the threshold x0
0 is de￿ned implicitly by the equation
W (x0













Since the left-hand-side of this equation is strictly increasing in x0
0, and equal to zero if x0
0 =
R0, whereas its left-hand-side is strictly positive, equation (27) has always a unique solution
over the range (R0;1): Hence, it exists a semi-closed set of positive measure [R0;x0
0), such
that the workers employed in ￿rms with productivity in this interval are strictly better-o⁄ as
unemployed in the more ￿ exible labor market with R = R0, than as employed in the status quo
equilibrium with R = R0. We summarize the last set of results in the following lemma, which
will be used later on in the characterization of the political equilibrium level of ￿ring costs.
Lemma 2 In voting between the two alternatives R0 and R0, where R0 > R0, the status quo is
preferred by the employed workers with a level of idiosyncratic productivity x 2 (x0
0;x￿) where
x￿ is de￿ned by (26), and x0
0 is de￿ned by equation (27). All the unemployed, and the employed
with productivity x 2 [R0;x0
0) [ (x￿;1); vote for the alternative R0.
A particularly important implication of the analysis leading to Lemma 2 is the existence
of a set of positive measure of workers, i.e. the employed in ￿rms with productivity smaller
19In particular, we remind that the terminal condition (10) implies the continuity of W = W (￿jR) at x = R,
for any value of R.
18than x￿, whose preferences over R are not single-peaked. The value of these workers is equal
to W (xjR) for any R such that R ￿ R ￿ x and, by Lemma 1, it is strictly decreasing in R
over the same range. However, the value of the same workers is equal to U (R) (since they are
￿red) for any R such that x ￿ R ￿ 1, which as we know is strictly increasing in R, i.e. their
preferences have two peaks. The presence of a set of positive measure of agents with non single-
peaked preferences in the policy variable implies the violation of one of the assumptions of the
median voter theorem, which therefore cannot be applied to solve for the political equilibrium
of the model.
5 Political Equilibria
Before proceeding to characterize the political equilibria of the model, we introduce the fol-
lowing pair of de￿nitions.
De￿nition 1 R = R￿ is a political equilibrium conditional on the status quo, if it defeats any
other alternative in pairwise comparisons conditionally on R = R0:
De￿nition 2 R = R￿ is an unconditional political equilibrium, if it defeats any other alter-
native in pairwise comparisons regardless on the status quo value of R.





￿ = 1; (28)
that is, at ￿ = ^ ￿, the threshold x￿ de￿ned by (26) is equal to the reservation productivity
R = 1 obtaining in absence of any ￿ring costs.
Proposition 2 If ￿ ￿ ^ ￿, where ^ ￿ is de￿ned implicitly as the solution of (28), then the unique
unconditional political equilibrium of the model involves setting R = 1 (i.e. F = 0), and this
choice is preferred at unanimity to any alternative.
Proof. See appendix.
Proposition 2 tells us that, as long as the rent extraction power of the employed is relatively
low, a fully ￿ exible labor market is politically stable, in the sense that workers prefer it at
unanimity to any possible alternative, whatever the status quo is. The intuition for this
result is that when the rents appropriated by the employed are small enough, workers have
19little reason to protect them by demanding any job security provisions, since the costs of
employment protection are larger than the corresponding gains for any positive value of F.
To complete the characterization of the political equilibrium, let us de￿ne ￿ x as the produc-
tivity level such that a worker is indi⁄erent between being employed in the most rigid economy
(i.e. where F = ^ F) in a ￿rm with idiosyncratic productivity equal to ￿ x, and unemployed in the
most ￿ exible economy possible (i.e. where F = 0). Formally, ￿ x is de￿ned implicitly by equa-
tion (27), setting R0 = R and R0 = 1 . Finally, let ￿￿ f(￿;￿)g indicate the Lebesgue-Stieltjes
measure induced by the distribution function of productivity across active ￿rms ￿(￿), de￿ned
in Proposition 1.
Proposition 3 Suppose that ￿ > ^ ￿, where ^ ￿ is de￿ned implicitly as the unique solution of
(28). We have that that:
1. If R0 < ￿ x, then R = R is the unique conditional political equilibrium if




Vice versa, R = 1 is the unique conditional political equilibrium if the reverse of condition
(29) holds.





Vice versa, R = 1 is the unique political equilibrium if the reverse of condition (30) holds.
Proof. See appendix.
Proposition 3 describes the basic structure of the political equilibrium, which has the
following characteristics. First, according to Proposition 3 the political equilibrium always
exists, and it involves either the choice of an unregulated labor market (i.e. F = 0) or a
maximally rigid labor market (i.e. F = ^ F). Second, according to Proposition 3, labor market
rigidity is supported by the workers who are employed in ￿rms which have an intermediate
level of idiosyncratic productivity when voting occurs. Vice versa, ￿ exibility is supported by
an extreme coalition made up by the workers employed by the more and by the less productive
￿rms, and also by all the unemployed. Third, Proposition 3 clari￿es what role history plays
in the model, i.e. how the political equilibrium emerging from the voting process is a⁄ected
20by the level of employment protection R0 present in the status quo.20 In particular, according
to Proposition 3, a set of positive measure of least productive employed workers favoring the
transition to a highly ￿ exible labor market exists provided that R0 < ￿ x, i.e. the economy is
relatively rigid to begin with. Vice versa, if R0 ￿ ￿ x all the employed workers with productivity
lower than x￿ are in favor of (more) labor market rigidity.
Remark 3 If ￿ = ^ ￿, equation (27) implies that x￿ = ￿ x = 1. Since ￿ x is decreasing in ￿, and
x￿ is increasing ￿ and equal to 1 when ￿ = ^ ￿ , we have that ￿ x < x￿ and R0 < x￿ for any ￿
greater than ^ ￿. It follows that the sets of workers in favor of a rigid labor market contemplated
by two cases of Proposition 3 are both non-empty.
5.1 Properties of the Political Equilibrium
In this subsection, we characterize how some endogenous elements of the equilibrium of the
model, i.e. the thresholds x￿, ￿ x and ^ ￿, are a⁄ected by the key exogenous parameters.
We begin by observing that the threshold value x￿ depends directly on the rent extraction
power of the employed ￿ and, through ￿, on the drift ￿ and on the instantaneous standard
deviation ￿. In particular, it can be shown with a straightforward di⁄erentiation of (26) that
x￿ is strictly increasing in ￿. This result is not surprising, since employment protection is
attractive for the employed only if the rents that they capture, which are proportional to ￿,
are large enough to compensate for the general equilibrium distortions caused by ￿ring costs.
Perhaps more surprisingly, how x￿ is a⁄ected by the other parameters of interest, ￿ and ￿,
depends on the rent extraction power of the employed, as clari￿ed by the following lemma.
Lemma 3 Higher volatility and lower growth both tend to increase the threshold x￿ de￿ned
in (26) if ￿ 2 (￿￿;1) where ￿￿ = e=(e + ￿+). Higher volatility and lower growth both tend to
decrease x￿ if ￿ 2 (0;￿￿), and do not a⁄ect x￿ if ￿ = ￿￿.
Proof. It follows from the di⁄erentiation of expression (26).
In words, how employed workers are a⁄ected by greater volatility of output growth and
by depressed productivity growth depends crucially on their power of rent extraction. Where
this power is relatively high, i.e. if ￿ > ￿￿, more volatility increases the productivity x￿ of
the marginal worker, as de￿ned in Lemma 1, and vice versa. Intuitively, this is because of
20The political equilibrium also depends on the status quo value of R through the level of employment L,
which in depends on the level of ￿ring costs. However, as we know from the analysis of the economic equilibrium
￿ring costs have ambiguous e⁄ects on equilibrium employment since they reduce by ￿rings and hirings.
21the following reason. It can be shown that in a more volatile economy, both the marginal
gain and the marginal loss caused by more ￿ exibility to the employed workers are magni￿ed,
re￿ ecting the existence of a complementarity between ￿ exibility and volatility. Which of these
two opposite e⁄ects dominates over the other depends on ￿. If ￿ > ￿￿, the rent is a relatively
important component of the welfare of the employed, and therefore the magni￿cation of the
marginal loss dominates over that of the marginal gain from higher labor market ￿ exibility.
As a result, the threshold x￿ has to increase in order to ensure that the marginal worker is
more insulated from the risk of job destruction by a higher idiosyncratic productivity.21 The
opposite happens if the power of rent extraction of the employed is relatively small, i.e. if
￿ < ￿￿, in which case the magni￿cation of the marginal loss is dominated by the magni￿cation
of the marginal gain from more labor market ￿ exibility and, as a result, the critical productivity
level x￿ has to fall. Similarly, it is possible to verify that lower productivity growth increases
both the marginal gain and the marginal loss caused by more ￿ exibility. When ￿ is relatively
high, the magni￿cation of the marginal loss dominates, and therefore x￿ must increase relative
to its initial value in order to make the marginal worker more insulated from the risk of
job destruction, reducing its marginal loss from more ￿ exibility. The converse is true if ￿ is
relatively low, in which case the threshold x￿ must decrease.
The next lemma clari￿es how the second productivity threshold ￿ x contemplated in Propo-
sition 3 is a⁄ected by the parameters of interest.
Lemma 4 The productivity level ￿ x de￿ned in (27) with R0 = R and R0 = 1 increases strictly
with ￿ and decreases strictly with ￿ and ￿.
Proof. See appendix.
That ￿ x decreases with ￿ is again not surprising since, if the employed workers are able
to extract higher rents from ￿rms, their position of insiders becomes clearly more appealing,
and this creates more scope for the desire to protect it with job security provisions. As a
result, the productivity threshold ￿ x falls. Higher volatility ￿ has qualitatively the opposite
e⁄ect of ￿ on the threshold ￿ x because in a more volatile environment, the risk of a critical fall
in productivity down to the absorbing barrier R is higher. As a result, the least productive
workers expect to earn less rents, for any given level of ￿ring costs, which makes them willing
21We remind that, because the paths of a Brownian process are (almost surely) continuous, the current
productivity level of a ￿rm exhibits some degree of persistence in the future. Therefore, the matches that are
relatively productive in the present are exposed to a lower risk of destruction in the future, all else equal. This
is re￿ ected in fact that, as already remarked, the rent of the employed decreases less with R the greater is x,
i.e. the cross-partial derivarive of V with respect to x and R is strictly positive.
22to give up, i.e. ￿ x increases. Finally, a higher value of the drift coe¢ cient ￿ is found to
reduce ￿ x. Intuitively, a higher value of ￿ means that employed workers, for any level of current
idiosyncratic productivity, expect to become relatively more productive in future. In particular,
a higher value of ￿ induces the workers employed at the moment of voting in low productivity
￿rms to become relatively more optimistic about their future productivity, and therefore about
the future amount of rents that they can appropriated of, conditionally on remaining employed.
The greater optimism makes these workers more reluctant to give up their position of insiders
by voting in favor of less stringent job security provisions.22
Finally, Lemma 5 clari￿es how the threshold value ^ ￿ depends on the parameters governing
the dynamics of productivity.
Lemma 5 The threshold ^ ￿ de￿ned implicitly by equation (28) increases strictly with ￿ and it
decreases strictly with ￿.
Proof. Straightforward implicit di⁄erentiation of equation (28).
According to Lemma 5 it is more likely, in the sense that the threshold ^ ￿ shifts to the right,
to obtain an equilibrium with unanimous political support for full ￿ exibility (i.e. F = 0) in
a more volatile economic environment. Intuitively, it can be shown that a fully ￿ exible labor
market is demanded at unanimity if x￿ ￿ 1.23 Moreover, as it can be easily veri￿ed by solving
for ^ ￿ in equation (28), ^ ￿ < ￿￿, where ￿￿ is de￿ned as in Lemma 3. It then follows directly
from Lemma 3 that when ￿ = ^ ￿ more volatility decreases the threshold productivity x￿, i.e.
it enlarges the set of parameters values such that x￿ ￿ 1. In particular, since x￿ is strictly
increasing in ￿, the set of values of ￿ consistent with a unanimous support for no ￿ring costs
becomes larger as ￿ increases. Also, by Lemma 3 the threshold x￿ increases when ￿ increases
and, as a result, the set of values of ￿ consistent with a unanimous support for no ￿ring costs
becomes smaller, i.e. ^ ￿ decreases.
22The proof of Lemma 4 assumes that the status quo reservation productivity does not change as the pa-
rameters in question change, because of the assumption that people vote on the e⁄ective level of employment
protection R rather than on the legislated one F. However, because the relation between R and F de￿ned by
equation (20) depends on these parameters, R itself would change if workers vote on F. Nonetheless, the result
demonstrated in the next section on the base of Lemma 4, that there is not a clear-cut relation between changes
in the economic environment, i.e. in ￿ and ￿; and the political viability of a reform of a rigid economy, does
not depend on whether R is held constant or not.
23This is established in the proof of Proposition 2 reported in the appendix.
236 The Rise and Persistence of Eurosclerosis
In this section, we attempt to use our model in order to shed some new light on the comparative
dynamics of labor market institutions in Continental Europe and in the U.S. and U.K. In
particular, we are interested in the question of how some unexpected shocks to the main
parameters of the model, i.e. ￿, ￿ and ￿, a⁄ect the political equilibrium given the status
quo level of ￿ring costs. Before continuing, we remind that a useful property of the model
previously remarked is that the value functions of all workers only depend on jump-variables,
i.e. workers make their voting decisions ￿comparing steady states.￿Moreover, the fact that
voting takes place as soon as an unexpected shock to the exogenous parameters occurs, implies
that the state-variables, i.e. the level of employment and the cross-sectional distribution of
productivity, are not a⁄ected on impact by the shock, which a⁄ects the equilibrium of the
model through the jump-variables only.
It is been widely remarked that the divergence of the labor market institutions of Continen-
tal Europe and of the U.S. has begun in the aftermath of the major negative macroeconomic
shocks, increasing volatility and reducing productivity growth, occurred during the 1970￿ s.24
Our model is consistent with this observation, since it implies that institutional divergence can
occur if the same negative shock hits economies which are relatively ￿ exible to begin with,
but which di⁄er in terms of the ability of labor to appropriate rents. According to Proposition
3, in a relatively ￿ exible economy (i.e. with R0 ￿ ￿ x) a transition to a rigid labor market is
favored by the employed workers with productivity in the interval (R0;x￿), which has measure
induced by ￿(￿) equal to
￿￿ f(R0;x￿)gL = [￿(x￿) ￿ ￿(R0)]L: (31)
The size of the coalition for rigidity increases with the rent extraction power of the employed ￿
since, as we already know, @x￿=@￿ > 0. Moreover, according to Lemma 3, how the size of the
coalition for rigidity is a⁄ected by a negative economic shock also depends on the value of ￿. In
particular, in an economy where labor appropriates of relatively high rents, i.e. where ￿ > ￿￿,
the threshold productivity level x￿ increases as @x￿=@￿ > 0 and @x￿=@￿ < 0. Vice versa, in
an economy where labor appropriates of relatively low rents, i.e. where ￿ < ￿￿, the threshold
productivity level x￿ decreases in response to the same economic shock, as @x￿=@￿ < 0 and
@x￿=@￿ > 0.
24See for example Gottschalk and Mo¢ tt (1994) and Comin and Philippon (2005) for evidence of increased
earnings and output volatility since 1970￿ s.
24Since the threshold x￿ is the only element of (31) a⁄ected by the shock in question, we
conclude that ￿bad times,￿such as those experienced by virtually all industrialized economies
during much of the 1970￿ s, increase the political support for the transition to a more rigid
labor market in high rents economies, such as those of Continental Europe. However, the
same type of shock does not make labor market rigidity more appealing politically in low
rents economies, such as the U.S., where indeed the size of the coalition for rigidity shrinks.
This result depends on the complementarity existing between volatility and ￿ exibility (and on
substitutability existing between growth and ￿ exibility), i.e. more volatility (or less growth)
boosts simultaneously the positive e⁄ect of ￿ exibility on job creation, as well as its negative
e⁄ect on the rents of the employed. It follows that employed workers demand higher ￿ring
costs only if the rent is a relatively important component of their welfare, i.e. if their rent
extraction power is high enough.
A the present moment, the political debate over labor market institutions in Continental
Europe is centered around the elimination of part of their rigidity. According to some authors
(e.g. Bean, 1998) ￿good times￿should be a favorable period for implementing reforms. Our
model, vice versa, calls into question this proposition since it implies the inexistence of a
simple relation between macroeconomic well-being and the political feasibility of labor market
reforms toward more ￿ exibility. This is because, as explained in the following, good times
make ￿ exibility more appealing among the most productive employed but, in a relatively rigid
economy, they also make it less appealing among the less productive employed, whose job is
sheltered by the high status quo level of job security provisions.
As we know, according to Proposition 3 the reform of a relatively rigid economy, i.e. with
R0 < ￿ x, consisting in increasing labor market ￿ exibility, is supported by all the unemployed,
and by the employed with productivity in the upper and lower tail of the distribution, i.e. with
x 2 [R0; ￿ x) and with x 2 (x￿;1). A higher value of ￿ decreases without ambiguity the size of
the coalition for reform, since x￿ is strictly increasing and ￿ x is strictly decreasing in ￿ and, as a
result, the size of the coalition for the preservation of the rigid status quo also increases if the
employed workers extract more rents from the ￿rms. To determine what impact ￿ and ￿ have
on the two threshold levels of productivity x￿ and ￿ x, we need to distinguish between the two
di⁄erent cases contemplated by Lemma 3, corresponding respectively to values of ￿ smaller or
greater than the threshold ￿￿. The case of ￿ > ￿￿ is more relevant here since it re￿ ects the
high-rents economies of Continental Europe. If ￿ > ￿￿ Lemmas 3 and 4 imply that the e⁄ects
of ￿ and ￿ on x￿ are such that @x￿=@￿ > 0 and @x￿=@￿ < 0, and their e⁄ects on ￿ x are such
25that @￿ x=@￿ > 0 and @￿ x=@￿ < 0.25
What can the model tell us about how favorable macroeconomic conditions a⁄ect the po-
litical viability of reforms of European labor markets? Unfortunately, not a clear-cut message.
This is because, as we know, the two thresholds x￿ and ￿ x de￿ning the coalition for rigidity
tend to move in the same direction, i.e. they both decrease, if ￿ decreases and if ￿ increases.
In particular, the measure of the set (x￿;1) of most productive employed workers who stand
for ￿ exibility, or
￿￿ f(x￿;1)gL = [1 ￿ ￿(x￿)]L;
increases as x￿ decreases. However, the same type of shock also tends to cut down the po-
litical support for ￿ exibility among the workers located at the bottom of the distribution of
productivity, namely the measure of the set (R0; ￿ x)
￿￿ f(R0; ￿ x)gL = [￿(￿ x) ￿ ￿(R0)]L;
by moving out of it some workers with productivity below the lower bound ￿ x. Intuitively, this
is because good economic conditions boost the rents that employed workers can potentially
obtain, and therefore make some of them more reluctant to give up their position of insiders.
As a result, whether the extent of the political support for rigidity among the workers with
intermediate productivity, i.e. the measure of the set (￿ x;x￿), increases or decreases cannot be
established a priori.
This result is particularly important, since it implies that the way labor market institutions
evolve in response to a worsening and to an improvement of aggregate business conditions
respectively, may be strikingly asymmetric. In particular, whereas a bad economic shock
may cause the breakdown of a relatively ￿ exible economy, a good shock hitting a rigid high-
rents economy need not have the e⁄ect of triggering the opposite transition to a more ￿ exible
labor market. This result is broadly consistent with, and provides a novel explanation for
the dynamics of labor market institutions observed in Continental Europe in the recent years,
which have shown little tendency to revert to ￿ exibility, long after the original negative shocks
favoring the build-up of Eurosclerosis have vanished.26
25If instead ￿ < ￿
￿, Lemmas 3 and 4 imply that @x
￿=@￿ < 0 and @x
￿=@￿ > 0 and, again, @￿ x=@￿ > 0 and
@￿ x=@￿ < 0. As a result, the coalition for rigidity in a low-rents economy becomes actually larger if the economy
is hit by a good economic shock. This result is analogous to Lemma 5, which implies that an improvement of
economic conditions makes it more unlikely to have a unanimous support for labor market ￿ exibility.
26It must be emphasized that the persistence of high levels of rent extraction power on the part of employed
workers, is imporant according to our model to explain the lack of reversibility displayed by Continental Euro-
pean labor market institutions. This is documented empirically by Saint-Paul (2004), who ￿nds no evidence of
a decline in the rents of employed workers in Europe during the 1990￿ s, with the exception of Ireland. See also
26We conclude this section by remarking that our model questions the validity of the argument
that good times are necessarily good also for reforms. Cutting down the rents appropriated
by the employed, i.e. reducing the value of ￿, is an important pre-requisite of a successful
reform of a rigid labor market. However, favorable economic shocks do not have clear-cut
consequences for the political feasibility of a reform aimed at making a rigid labor market
more ￿ exible.
7 Conclusions
This paper has presented a simple model of political economy of the labor market, with the
aim of explaining the comparative dynamics of one institution, employment protection legis-
lation, in Europe and in the U.S. in the last few decades. At the methodological level, the
paper represents an important innovation to the existing literature, since it relies on the novel
assumption that the dynamics of productivity is described by a Geometric Brownian process
rather than, as usually assumed, by a Poisson process. This assumption is important since it
implies that the preferences on employment protection legislation of the workers are a⁄ected by
their own idiosyncratic productivity at the moment of voting. This is because relatively more
productive jobs are expected to last longer, due to the persistence of idiosyncratic productivity
implied by the continuity of the paths of Brownian motion.
A key result demonstrated concerns the broad importance of the rents that employed
workers are able to extract from ￿rms. The capacity of labor to appropriate rents and labor
turnover restrictions, have appeared to be closely linked as part of rigid politico-economic
equilibria. This result is quite intuitive given that if rents are low, then there is clearly little
scope to demand their protection with stringent job security provisions either. Moreover, and
perhaps more surprisingly, how labor market institutions are a⁄ected by economic shocks, has
also been found to depend on the extent of the rents appropriated by labor (i.e. on whether
￿ is above the critical threshold ￿￿ de￿ned in Lemma 3), as well as on the status quo level of
￿ring costs (i.e. on whether R0 is greater than ￿ x according to Proposition 3).
The results provided by the analysis of the political equilibrium of the model, have then
been used to demonstrate that the di⁄erent bargaining strength of labor can explain the di-
verging pattern of institutional evolution experienced by Continental Europe and by the U.S.,
in response to similar major negative shocks during the 1970￿ s. In addition, a novel potential
M￿ller and Aldashev (2005), who document that employed workers have been able to appropriate of persistently
higher rents in Germany than in the U.S., since the early 1980￿ s.
27explanation has been provided of why the institutional rigidity typical of Continental European
labor markets, emerged in the past decades, has largely persisted up to the present day, long
after the shocks originally favoring its creation have vanished. More generally, an important
implication of our model is that once stringent job security provisions are put in place, they
have the potential to be persistent across di⁄erent economic conditions, i.e. there exists in this
respect a scope for institutional hysteresis.
8 Appendix
8.1 Derivation of the Expected PDV of Output
The integral in (9) can be broken down recursively to obtain the following recursion, satis￿ed
by the functional V (￿) over the region (R;1) of productivity levels such that ￿rms continue
operating




The second order di⁄erential equation obtained by applying Ito￿ s lemma to (32) in order to
compute the expression of E(dV ), reads
1
2
￿2x2V 00 (x) + ￿xV 0 (x) ￿ rV (x) + x = 0: (33)




+ D1x￿ + D2x￿; (34)
where ￿ and ￿ denote respectively the positive and negative root of the relevant characteris-




+ ￿￿ ￿ r
￿
associated with (41). The expression of equation (12) follows from (34),
excluding the positive root ￿ by setting D1 = 0 in (34) for the standard reason, and by taking
into account the boundary condition V (R) = 0.
8.2 Derivation of the Wage Schedule
Combining equations (8) and (9) by setting x = 1, the ￿ ow-value of unemployment can be
expressed as
rU = b + ￿￿V (1): (35)
28Substituting for W (x) using equation (9), and using the fact, also implied by (9), that
E(dW)=dt = ￿E(dV )=dt, the recursion (7) can be written as




Also, by combining equations (35) and (36), we obtain that




Finally, substituting in this equation the expression of V (x) provided by (32), (37) can be
written as the expression reported in equation (11).
8.3 Solution of the Firms￿Optimal Stopping Problem
Firms face a standard problem of optimal stopping in continuous time, which is formalized by
the Bellman-Wald equation (4). It is well known that the solution of this class of problems
(e.g. Dixit, 1993; Dixit and Pindyck, 1994; Peskir and Shiryaev, 2006) is characterized in
terms of a productivity threshold R, such that the continuation value of the asset exceeds the
value of the asset upon stopping as long as x > R and is exceeded by it if x < R, with the two
values matching at x = R. The optimal stopping rule of the ￿rm is to continue producing as
long as x remains above R, and to close down, ￿ring the workers and paying the associated
layo⁄ cost F, as soon as the absorbing barrier R is ￿rst reached. On the continuation region
fx 2 R+ : x > Rg, therefore, the functional equation (4) corresponds to the Hamilton-Jacobi-
Bellman equation




while at the absorbing barrier R, the following ￿value matching￿(or continuous ￿t) condition
J (R) = ￿F (39)
must hold, establishing the continuity of the value function J (￿) upon stopping. A second
functional relation, the ￿smooth pasting￿ (or smooth ￿t) condition, must also hold for the
stopping rule to be optimal. This condition states that the value function is di⁄erentiable with
continuity along the curve separating the continuation region from the stopping region. Here,
the continuation value of the ￿rm upon stopping is equal to ￿F, and therefore the smooth
pasting condition implies that
29J 0 (R) = 0: (40)
Equation (38) can be transformed into a second order ordinary di⁄erential equation in the
unknown function J (￿) by applying Ito￿ s lemma to compute the expression of E(dJ). This
allows us to transform the optimal stopping problem of the ￿rm in a free-boundary problem.
The di⁄erential equation satis￿ed by J (￿) reads
1
2
￿2x2J 00 (x) + ￿xJ 0 (x) ￿ rJ (x) + x ￿ w(x) = 0: (41)
Using the expression of the wage rate w(x) reported in (11), the general integral of this equation





b + ￿￿V (1)
r
+ D1x% + D2x￿;
with D1 and D2 standing for constants to be determined, and with % and ￿ standing for the
positive and for the negative root of the characteristic polynomial
￿2
2
￿(1 ￿ ￿) + ￿￿ ￿ r (42)
associated with (41). By a standard argument (e.g. Dixit, 1993, p. 25), the root % must be
eliminated by setting the constant D1 equal to zero. This is because otherwise the fundamental
of the asset would become negligible, relatively to its option value, as x " 1. The value of D2
is instead determined through the smooth pasting condition, which implies that
D2 =
(1 ￿ ￿)R1￿￿
(r ￿ ￿)￿+ :











(￿2 ￿ 2￿)2 + 8￿2r
￿
; (43)







8.4 Proof of Proposition 1
In order to describe the evolution of the productivity of a ￿rm it is convenient to consider, rather
than the original process x, the transformed process z ￿ lnx: It is known (e.g. Dixit, 1993)
30that, since x represents a Geometric Brownian process with drift ￿ and instantaneous standard







standard deviation ￿. Notice that, because the initial value of x is normalized to one, the
initial value of z is equal to zero. Moreover, the drift ￿ of the transformed process is negative,
since ￿ < ￿2=2 by assumption.
Next, focusing the attention with no loss of generality on a ￿rm created at time s = 0,
de￿ne p(z0;z;t) as the probability density function of z, conditional on the fact that and that
the process z has never reached the barrier ^ R ￿ lnR within the time interval (0;t), starting




z (t) > z
￿ ￿





p(z0;￿;t)d￿ ￿ P (z0;z;t): (45)
Using this expression, we can write the probability that the process z has not yet been absorbed








as the random time elapsed since
the creation of the ￿rm in question, at which the process describing the evolution of the (log














Since our objective is to compute the probability distribution of a ￿rst passage time of a
Brownian motion, it is natural to look at the Kolmogorov backward partial di⁄erential equation



















given the pair of boundary conditions
P
￿
^ R; ^ R;t
￿





The ￿rst boundary condition re￿ ects the fact that absorption immediately occurs if z0 = ^ R,
and the second boundary condition re￿ ects the fact that absorption occurs with probability
zero in a ￿nite time, if the process z starts at an initial position in￿nitely distant from the
barrier. For our purpose, it is convenient to solve the boundary value problem represented






















By transforming both sides of equation (47) using the theorem of di⁄erentiation of the original,
and the fact that at the moment of creation, the probability that the productivity of a ￿rm is




















= ￿L ￿ 1; (50)
subject to the pair of transformed boundary conditions
L
￿
￿; ^ R; ^ R
￿


















+ ￿￿ ￿ ￿
￿
associated with









1 ￿ e#(￿)(z0￿ ^ R)
i
: (52)
















where the second equality follows by applying de l￿ Hospital theorem to compute the limit.








PrfT (R) > tgdt; (54)
















which corresponds to the expression reported in (22).
32To complete the proof of Proposition 1, we need to characterize the ergodic cross-sectional
distribution of productivity across active ￿rms. Using again the transformation z ￿ lnx, we
can write the the steady state cross-sectional distribution of z across employment as
~ ￿(z) ￿ PrfZ ￿ zg = 1 ￿ PrfZ > zg: (55)
Also, using the expression of the transition density of z conditional on non-absorption de￿ned
in (45), we can write that










This expression corresponds to the integral sum of the number of ￿rms created since the
in￿nitely remote past, which have survived up to time t and have productivity at t greater
than z, weighted by the steady state level of employment.
Next, using the expression of ￿ derived above and reported in (22), the fact that equation
(15) implies that ￿(1 ￿ L)=L = ￿, and changing variables, we can also write this expression as






where P (z0;z;t) is de￿ned as in (45). Using (56) we can then write (55) as






To make progress in characterizing ~ ￿(￿), we consider the Kolmogorov backward di⁄erential
equation satis￿ed by P (z0;z;t), which is equivalent to equation (47), together with the pair





= 0 and limz0!1P (z0;z;t) = 1: (58)
It is again convenient to solve the backward equation (47) subject to (58), with the Laplace





the expression of ~ ￿(￿) can be directly obtained by computing the limit of L(￿;z0;z) as ￿ # 0.
To compute the expression of the Laplace transform (59), we begin by transforming equation



















= ￿L; if z0 ￿ z; (61)














e￿1( ^ R￿z)e￿1(z0￿ ^ R) ￿ e￿2(z0￿ ^ R)
￿2 ￿ ￿1














; if z0 > z;
(64)































￿ Ifz￿z0g ￿ e
￿
2￿
￿2 ( ^ R￿z)
￿
: (65)
The ergodic cross-sectional distribution of z across active ￿rms can at this point be computed
by setting z0 = 0 in (65) and by substituting the corresponding expression in (57). Finally, the
ergodic cross-sectional distribution of x across active ￿rms ￿(￿) can be simply obtained from
the corresponding expression of z by setting z = lnx, and it reads





￿2 ln(x) + 1
￿
￿ IfR￿x￿1g + e
2￿






The expression of the ergodic cross-sectional density function of productivity reported in (23)
is obtained by di⁄erentiating ￿(￿) with respect to x and rearranging terms.
27The details of the following algebraic derivations are available upon request from the author.
348.5 Comparative Statics Properties of the Economic Equilibrium
Properties (1) and (2) follow from a straightforward implicit di⁄erentiation in equations (17)
and (20).
To prove property (3), we begin by noticing that equation (20) implies that the equilib-
rium reservation productivity R depends on ￿ only through ￿. Di⁄erentiating implicitly the




1 ￿ R￿ + ln(R￿)
￿(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ R￿)
; (67)
and this expression is negative since the denominator of (67) is positive, while the numerator
is negative. The denominator of (67) is positive since ￿ < 0 and since equation (20) implies
that R < 1 for any possible value of F, so that R￿ > 1; the fact that 1￿a+lna < 0 for every
a 6= 1 also implies that the numerator of (67) is negative. The result that in equilibrium R
decreases with ￿ follows since @￿=@￿ > 0 by (44).
To prove property (4), it is useful to establish ￿rst the following preliminary result. Letting
as before R denote the equilibrium reservation productivity de￿ned by equation (20), using





= R1￿￿1 ￿ R￿ + R￿ ln(R￿)
￿(1 ￿ R￿)
> 0; (68)
since, as already remarked, R￿ > 1 and moreover 1 ￿ a + aln(a) > 0 for any a > 1.
Observe next that the equilibrium job creation rate ￿ de￿ned by (19) depends on ￿ only
through ￿, and that ￿ a⁄ects ￿ both directly and indirectly through R (which as we already
know by (20) depends on ￿ only through ￿). It follows that how ￿ a⁄ects ￿ depends on the
total derivative of ￿ with respect to ￿. By equation (19), the total derivative with respect to
￿ of the schedule ￿ ￿ ￿(R(￿);￿) representing the equilibrium job creation rate as a function




[r(1 ￿ ￿) + ￿+￿￿]
d(R1￿￿)
d￿ + [(r ￿ ￿)(b + r’) ￿ r(1 ￿ ￿)] + ￿￿
￿
1 ￿ R1￿￿￿
￿+￿ (1 ￿ R1￿￿)
: (69)






￿+ ￿ [(r ￿ ￿)(b + r’) ￿ r(1 ￿ ￿)]; (70)




r(1 ￿ ￿) + ￿+￿￿







￿2￿ (1 ￿ R1￿￿)
; (71)
which is positive since as we already know by (68) d
￿
R1￿￿￿
=d￿ > 0 and obviously R1￿￿ < 1.
The result that in equilibrium ￿ increase strictly with ￿ follows since @￿=@￿ > 0 by (44).
Finally, property (5) can be demonstrated by observing that the equilibrium reservation
productivity R determined by equation (20) depends on ￿ both directly and through ￿, i.e.
we have that
R ￿ R(￿(￿);￿): (72)












A straightforward implicit di⁄erentiation of (20) implies that @R=@￿ > 0, i.e. holding ￿
constant, R increases with ￿. Moreover, we know from (67) that R is strictly decreasing in ￿
and we know from (44) that @￿=@￿ < 0. It follows that dR=d￿ > 0.
To understand why productivity growth has a ambiguous e⁄ect on job creation, notice
that ￿ depends on ￿ in a variety of ways. In particular, ￿ a⁄ects ￿ directly, but also indirectly
through ￿ and through the equilibrium reservation productivity (itself a function of ￿ and ￿).
Using (72), we can write the equilibrium job creation rate as a function of ￿ as
￿ ￿ ￿(R(￿(￿);￿);￿(￿);￿):

















A straightforward di⁄erentiation of equation (19), that the direct e⁄ect of ￿ on ￿ is positive,
i.e. @￿=@￿ > 0. Moreover, we know that by (19) in equilibrium ￿ increases with R, i.e.
@￿=@R > 0, and that R increases directly with ￿ by (73), i.e. @R=@￿ > 0. This implies that
both the second and the term component of the total derivative of ￿ with respect to ￿ (74) are
positive. However, by (71), we know that ￿ has a positive overall e⁄ect on ￿ , i.e. d￿=d￿ > 0,
and that @￿=@￿ < 0, which means that the ￿rst term of d￿=d￿ is negative. Which of the
opposite e⁄ects of ￿ on ￿ dominates over the other cannot be established a priori.
368.6 Proof of Proposition 2
We already know that the value of the unemployed is strictly increasing in R for any value of
R, and for any value of ￿. To determine the voting decision of the employed workers under
the assumption stated in Proposition 2 that ￿ ￿ ^ ￿, where we remind that ^ ￿ is de￿ned as the
(unique) solution to equation x￿ (￿) = 1, we begin by noticing that, since the threshold x￿
de￿ned in (26) is strictly increasing in ￿, this condition implies that
x￿ ￿ 1; (75)
namely that x￿ is lower or equal to the reservation productivity obtaining when F = 0. Some
simple algebra shows that (75) implies that
x￿ ￿ (R)







for any possible value of R, which in turn implies that
W (x￿ jR) ￿ U (1); (76)
where we remind that W (xjR) denotes the value of employment in a ￿rm with productivity x,
conditionally on R expressed by equation (25), and U (1) denotes the value of unemployment
conditionally on R = 1 (i.e. on F = 0) expressed by equation (24).
In particular, because W (￿jR) is strictly increasing in x, if condition (76) holds, all the
workers who are employed in the status quo in ￿rms with productivity x 2 [R0;x￿], and
whose value is W (xjR0) in the status quo and W (xjR) for any R such that R ￿ R0, are
better-o⁄ as unemployed with R = 1, than they are as employed for any value of R such that
R ￿ R0. If instead the reservation productivity is set at any level R such that R > R0, a
worker with productivity x 2 [R0;x￿] remains employed if x > R, in which cases its welfare
decreases relative to W (xjR0) as the labor market becomes more ￿ exible by Lemma 1, and
it is therefore also lower than U (1) by (76), or becomes unemployed if x ￿ R. If this case, its
welfare is as well lower than U (1), since the value of unemployment is strictly increasing in R
for any value of R. It follows that all workers with productivity x 2 [R0;x￿] are better-o⁄ as
unemployed with R = 1 than they are by implementing any R 6= 1, for any status quo R0.
Finally, by Lemma 1, all the workers who are employed in ￿rms with productivity x such
that x > x￿ strictly prefer to implement R = 1 to any R 6= 1, for any value of R0 if their job is
not destroyed due to the reform. If ￿ ￿ ^ ￿, we have that x￿ ￿ 1, which implies that all workers
37who are employed in the status quo in ￿rms with productivity x > x￿ remain employed for
any R 2 [R0;1].
We conclude that R = 1 defeats at unanimity in pairwise comparison any possible alter-
native value of R, and therefore it is the unique Condorcet winner emerging from a majority
voting process, whatever the status quo is.
8.7 Proof of Lemma 4
We remind that ￿ x is de￿ned implicitly by equation (27), setting R0 = R and R0 = 1. That
@￿ x=@￿ < 0 follows immediately from the fact that the left-hand-side of equation (27) is in-
creasing in ￿ x while the right-hand-side of the same equation is decreasing in ￿. Also, equation
(27) implies that ￿ x depends on ￿ and ￿ only through ￿. By di⁄erentiating implicitly ￿ x in








￿ + ￿2 (R)




￿ x ￿ ￿(R)
1￿￿ ￿ x￿
i :
where ￿ ￿ 1 ￿ (R)
1￿￿. The sign of this expression is positive since both the numerator and
the denominator are obviously positive. The proof of Lemma 4 follows from how ￿ depends
on ￿ and ￿ (see (44)).
8.8 Proof of Proposition 3
The proof is articulated in two parts. We ￿rst show that the possible outcome of a majority
voting process are only three, i.e. the status quo R0, R and 1. Then we show that the social
preference relation induced by majority voting, denoted as ￿, is transitive (i.e. there are no
Condorcet cycles). We use this preliminary result to demonstrate the political equilibrium
always exists, and it is either R = 1 or R = R.
We begin by stating the following two preliminary results.
Claim 1 Suppose that 9 R = R0 < R0 such that R0 ￿ R0, then R (i.e. maximum rigidity)
defeats any R such that R ￿ R0 in pairwise comparisons.
Proof. Lemma 1 implies that R0 is preferred to R0 by all and only the employed workers
with productivity above x￿. Also, the value of these workers W (￿jR) is strictly increasing in
R, for any R > R0. In addition, all the unemployed prefer R0 since their value U is strictly
increasing in R for any R. It follows that if a majority of workers prefer R0 to R0, then the
same majority of workers prefer R to any R such that R ￿ R0.
38Claim 2 Suppose that 9 R = R00 > R0 such that R00 ￿ R0, then R = 1 (i.e. maximum
￿exibility) defeats any R such that R ￿ R00 in pairwise comparisons.
Proof. Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 imply that R00 is preferred to R0 by all the employed




0 in Lemma 2, as the level of productivity such that W (x00
0 jR0) = U (R00). Also,
the value of the employed workers with productivity x above x￿, W (xjR00), is strictly increasing
in R00, and the value that the employed workers with productivity x 2 [R0;x00
0) obtain from the
reform, U (R00), is strictly increasing in R00. It follows that both these set of workers, and the
workers who are unemployed in the status quo, prefer R = 1 to any R such that R ￿ R00.
Claim 1 and Claim 2 imply that, in order to characterize the political equilibrium of the
model, we can restrict the attention to the choice between three possible levels of reservation
productivity, the status quo R0, R and R = 1, since any other value of R is defeated in pairwise
comparisons by at least one of these alternatives, i.e. it is not a Condorcet winner.
The rest of the proof leads to the demonstration of existence of a political equilibrium
and to its characterization. We consider separately the outcomes of the voting over R in two
possible cases contemplated by Proposition 3, of R0 < ￿ x and of R0 ￿ ￿ x respectively, where we
remind that ￿ x is de￿ned as unique productivity level such that W (￿ xjR) = U (1).
Case 1 R0 < ￿ x.
We rely on the following preliminary result.
Claim 3 Let ￿ x0 be de￿ned as the unique productivity level such that W (￿ x0 jR0) = U (1); we
have that ￿ x < ￿ x0 if R0 > R, and ￿ x = ￿ x0 if R0 = R.
Proof. Consider the equation W (xjR) = U (1), where as usual W (xjR) is de￿ned in








where ￿ ￿ ￿￿+=(1 ￿ ￿). The denominator of this expression is positive, and therefore the
sign of @x=@R is positive if (1 ￿ x￿￿) < 0. A simple manipulation of this expression shows
that @x=@R > 0 if x < x￿, where we remind that x￿ is de￿ned by (26). We already know (see
Remark 3) that if ￿ > ^ ￿, then ￿ x < x￿; it is straightforward to use the same argument made in
Remark 3 to conclude that ￿ x0 < x￿ if ￿ > ^ ￿. Since maxh￿ x; ￿ x0i < x￿, we have that @x=@R > 0
39for x 2 f￿ x; ￿ x0g and, because R0 > R, this implies that ￿ x0 > ￿ x. The second statement of the
claim is obvious.
We know from Lemma 1 that R is preferred strictly to R0 by the employed with productivity
x 2 (R0;x￿). This set has Lebesgue-Stieltjes (henceforth LS) measure28
￿0 ￿ ￿￿ f(R0;x￿)gL:
Moreover, according to Lemma 2, R0 is preferred to R = 1 by the workers with productivity
x 2 (￿ x0;x￿), which has LS measure
￿1 ￿ ￿￿ f(￿ x0;x￿)gL:
Finally, R is preferred to R = 1 by the workers with productivity x 2 (￿ x;x￿), which has LS
measure
￿2 ￿ ￿￿ f(￿ x;x￿)gL:
If R0 > R, Claim 3 implies that ￿ x0 < ￿ x implies that (￿ x0;x￿) ￿ (￿ x;x￿), we have that the
following inequalities hold
￿1 < ￿2 < ￿0: (77)
We distinguish two sub-cases, 1A and 1B, depending on the value of ￿0.
Sub-case 1A: ￿0 ￿ 1=2. In this case, ￿1 and ￿2 and also both lower than 1=2 by (77). This
means that R0 ￿ R; 1 ￿ R0 and 1 ￿ R ) R = 1 defeats any alternative.
Sub-case 1B: ￿0 > 1=2. We have to consider three possibilities. (1) ￿1 and ￿2 are also
both greater than 1=2. In this case, we have that R ￿ R0, R0 ￿ 1 and R ￿ 1 ) R defeats
any alternative. (2) ￿1 < 1=2 and ￿2 ￿ 1=2. In this case we have that R ￿ R0, 1 ￿ R0, and
R ￿ 1 ) R defeats any alternative. (3) ￿1 and ￿2 are both lower than 1=2. In this case, we
have that R ￿ R0, 1 ￿ R0, and 1 ￿ R ) R = 1 defeats any alternative.
We conclude that the social preference relation ￿ induced by majority voting is transitive,
i.e. a conditional political equilibrium exists. Moreover, R = 1 defeats any alternative in
pairwise comparisons if ￿2 ￿ 1=2 and, vice versa, R = 1 defeats any alternative in pairwise
comparisons if ￿2 < 1=2.
If R0 = R, Claim 3 implies that ￿ x0 = ￿ x, i.e. that ￿1 = ￿2. It is straightforward to deduce
that the political equilibrium exists also in this special case, and it is the same as described
above.
28We remind that ￿(￿) is de￿ned as a distribution function across employment, and thus we need to multiply
￿￿ by L to compute the size of the coalition in question.
40Case 2 R0 ￿ ￿ x.
In this case, we have that ￿2 = ￿0. The proof is almost identical to the one relative to that
of Case 1 and it is therefore omitted.
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